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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The “Working Definition of Antisemitism” recognized 
by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance 
(IHRA) in 2016 is an instrument for collecting required 
data on and fighting antisemitism that has achieved 
wide dissemination. In a field of action characterized 
by a high degree of conceptual insecurity, the definition 
promises conceptual orientation by providing a basis 
for practical work. Indeed, with its concrete language 
devoid of technical jargon and its tangible examples 
that illustrate the concept of antisemitism using typical, 
recurring phenomena, the “Working Definition” 
has become the basis for the work of various groups 
of users. Moreover, the adoption of hitherto rarely 
examined aspects of antisemitism related to Israel 
provided an update for the discussion that was 
necessary at the time the definition was formulated (in 
the early 2000s).
However, a closer examination also reveals severe 
deficits. In particular, the “Working Definition” is 
inconsistent, contradictory and formulated very 
vaguely. It therefore does not satisfy the requirements 
of a good definition. Moreover, the core definition of 
antisemi tism is reductionist. It emphasizes some 
antisemitic phenomena and levels of analysis but 
largely omits other essential ones. This applies in 
particular to ideological and discursive aspects, for 
example antisemitism as a conspiracist worldview. 
Aspects of organizational sociology related to mobili-
zation in movements and political parties as well as 
their consequences in discriminatory institutional 
regulations and practices are also not mentioned. 
Moreover, some of the examples related to Israel 
appended to the core definition can only be classified 
as antisemitic within context using further information, 
as what is described is ambiguous and occurs in 
complex, overlapping constellations of conflicts, 
which often do not readily allow singling out one 
specific problem such as antisemitism. An example is 
afforded by the so-called double standards. They are 
not sufficient criteria for distinguishing an antisemitic 
focus on Israel from one related to the specific features 
of Israeli policies and their geopolitical significance.
As a consequence, the “Working Definition” is 
con ducive to contradictory and error-prone application 
in practice and leads to assessments of incidents and 
facts that are not based on clear criteria but on the 
preconceptions of those applying it or on prevalent 
interpretations adopted without reflection. Applying 
the “Working Definition” creates the fiction of an 
objective assessment guided by criteria. The definition 
provides procedural legitimacy for decisions that are 
in fact taken on the basis of other criteria that remain 
implicit and are specified neither in the definition nor in 
the examples.
The weaknesses of the “Working Definition” are 
the gateway to its political instrumentalization, for 
instance for morally discrediting opposing positions 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the accusation of 
antisemitism. This has relevant implications for 
fundamental rights. The increasing implementation 
of the “Working Definition” as a quasi-legal basis for 
administrative action promises regulatory potential. 
In fact, it is instead an instrument that all but invites 
arbitrariness. It can be used to abridge fundamental 
rights particularly freedom of speech with respect to 
disfavoured positions on Israel. In contrast to what 
the designation “Working Definition” suggests, no 
further development of the definition to rectify these 
weaknesses is occurring.
The bottom line is that the attempt to solve problems 
of general conceptual clarification and universal 
applicability by means of the “Working Definition of 
Antisemitism” must be seen to have failed. Mainly 
due to its technical weaknesses, the deficient practice 
of its application, its nevertheless partly binding legal 
status and its potential for political instrumentalization 
with problematic implications for freedom of speech, 
the use of the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” 
cannot be recommended. A potential exception could 
only lie in narrowly defined pedagogical contexts. As 
the genesis of the “Working Definition of Antisem-
itism” and its wide dissemination indicate, there is—
not least in view of the persisting threat from current 
antisemitism—a great need on the part of various 
institutions for practicable criteria for identifying 
antisemitic phenomena. The development of clear and 
context-specific instruments for practical application is 
therefore urgently recommended.
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6IntroduCtIon
I INTRODUCTION
The “Working Definition of Antisemitism” has been 
well-known worldwide at least since it was adopted 
and disseminated by the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)1 in 2016. The English 
version reads as follows:
Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be 
expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical 
manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish 
or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward 
Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.
The definition is supplemented by explanatory notes 
and a list of examples intended to facilitate working 
with the definition as well as explanations of the terms: 
antisemitic acts, crimes, and discrimination.2�The 
examples deal with various aspects of antisemitism, 
including, extensively, antisemitism related to Israel. 
The definition is being used by a growing number of 
states and authorities as well as national and interna-
tional organizations in the fields of political education, 
monitoring, prevention, prosecution, and occasionally 
in research. At the same time, the “Working Definition” 
and in particular the examples appended to it have 
been and continue to be subject to strong criticism. 
This criticism is predominantly directed at aspects of 
the text, which deal with criticism of or hostility toward 
Israel as a potential form of antisemitism. Critics of 
the definition interpret this as improperly equating 
criticism of Israeli policies with antisemitism, and 
view such use of the “Working Definition” as a severe 
infringement on freedom of speech (e.g. Jewish 
Voice for Peace 2018; Algazi et al. 2018). The contrast 
between the great popularity and wide dissemination 
of the document, on the one hand, and harsh criticism, 
on the other, forms the point of departure of the 
following analysis. 
This expert opinion has the following objectives: 
–  present background information on the “Working 
Definition of Antisemitism” (need, history, dissemi-
nation and application);
–  provide an assessment and critique of the content 
with particular focus on aspects related to Israel;
–  assess legal, ethical and political implications;
–  develop recommendations for dealing with the 
“Working Definition of Antisemitism”.
1 The IHRA is a coalition of 33 full and nine associate member states in which dele-
gations composed of government representatives and experts deal with Holocaust 
remembrance and related educational measures. 2 See full text in the Appendix.
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II BACKGROUND: HISTORY, DISSEMINATION, AND STATUS 
OF THE “WORKING DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM”
A ORIGINS
After a large number of violent anti-Jewish incidents, 
in particular in France, and the resulting increased 
attention to antisemitism in the early 2000s, the 
“Working Definition” satisfied a widely felt need from 
various institutions for a concept of antisemitism 
suitable for practical use.3 An important role in this 
played the contemporary discourse on so-called new 
antisemitism (for the debate on this see Rabinovici 
2004; Holz 2005), which, according to proponents 
of this concept, is predominantly related to Israel. 
It brought into view antisemitic tendencies beyond 
the extreme Right, in particular among Muslims and 
on the political Left. The report, “Manifestations of 
Antisemitism in the European Union” (Bergmann and 
Wetzel 2003), of the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)4 and the antisem-
itism conference of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were milestones on the 
path to the “Working Definition”. In the Berlin Decla-
ration (OSCE 2004), adopted there, the participating 
states committed themselves to fighting antisemitism 
and regularly monitoring antisemitic phenomena. This 
task was entrusted to the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which was to 
cooperate with UN and EU institutions, in particular the 
EUMC, for this purpose.
Against this background, a definition of antisemitism 
was drafted in a consultative process by various 
experts with the particular involvement of Jewish 
organizations as well as the OSCE and the EUMC (see 
also Lerman 2018: Chap. 5).5 It was published on the 
EUMC website under the title “Working Definition of 
Antisemitism” in 2005. It was applied in the work of 
the EUMC, the OSCE and various non-governmental 
organizations, but also in lawsuits, without ever being 
given a formal status by the EUMC. In 2013, the 
EUMC’s successor, the Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA), removed the definition from its website in 
the course of a document cleanup. However, in the 
meantime it had spread and was being used separately 
from its institutional context. Finally, in 2015, the 
IHRA’s Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust 
Denial addressed the definitional question. On its 
recommendation, the IHRA meeting in 2016 adopted 
the “Working Definition of Antisemitism”, prompting 
its increased use, especially in IHRA member states.
B VERSIONS
Different variants of the “Working Definition of 
Antisemitism” are in use today. These usually do 
not differ with respect to the sentences of the core 
definition quoted above. However, there are versions 
in which individual sentences have been added to the 
core definition, as in the variant used by the German 
government. In this variant, the core definition is 
supplemented by a sentence from the explanatory 
notes of the IHRA definition, according to which it 
may also be applicable to phenomena directed against 
Israel as a Jewish collective. However, the statement 
following this sentence in the complete IHRA 
version—that this does not include criticism of Israel 
that is comparable to criticism of other states—was 
not included, nor were the examples and the other 
explanations.
These examples are treated in very different ways. 
Sometimes they are viewed (and published) as a 
genuine part of the definition but other times they are 
not (see e.g. Tomlinson 2017; Lerman 2018: Chap. 
8). Moreover, different examples were included in 
adopting the “Working Definition”. The US originally 
used examples oriented toward the 3D test for antisem-
itism—demonization, double standards, delegitimi-
zation (Sharansky 2004)—but has in the meantime 
migrated to the examples provided in the IHRA version. 
The British Labour Party (see below) adopted some of 
the existing examples and added some additional ones 
for which it was so severely criticized that it ended up 
backing away from the modifications.
Regardless, the original version of the EUMC and the 
current one of the IHRA form the essential basis of all 
variants. These two versions differ not in the wording 
but in the arrangement of the explanatory notes on 
antisemitic criticism of Israeli policies and in the 
grouping of the examples in the text.6 The remarks in 
this expert opinion refer to the version adopted by the 
IHRA unless otherwise noted.7
C LEGAL STATUS, DISSEMINATION,  
AND USE
The IHRA designates the status of the “Working 
Definition” as “not legally binding”. Nevertheless, the 
definition has a binding quasi-legal character in various 
contexts without having the corresponding legitimacy 
(Gould 2018a, 2018b). Various entities have espoused 
3 For the history of the definition see also Elman (2014: 62), Unabhängiger Exper-
tenkreis Antisemitismus (2017: 23), Stern (2017), Porat (2018: 44). 4 The EUMC 
was an agency of the European Union that existed until 2007 and was tasked with 
collecting data on racism and xenophobia. It was succeeded in 2007 by the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which has a similar but expan-
ded mandate. 5 Kenneth S. Stern (then American Jewish Committee) was the co-
ordinator; the team included Michael Whine (Community Security Trust, UK). 6 In 
the IHRA version, the original partition into five examples relating to Israel, framed 
by introductions, and six fundamental examples, was replaced by a simple list of 
eleven examples accompanied by the same explanatory notes though differently 
arranged. 7 The present text was initially written for a German audience and was 
based on the analysis of the German text version of the “Working Definition”. It 
was slightly revised upon translation into English. Some specific references to the 
German context that were retained are explained. However, the reference definiti-
on for this text is now the English text version.
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the definition with different degrees of “bindingness”. 
This is expressed inter alia by various government 
entities adopting, taking note of or “indorsing” (the 
formulation used by the German government is “indos-
sieren”) the definition while also prescribing its use 
for subordinate authorities and using it operationally. 
For instance, according to press reports, the German 
Federal Ministry of Justice is planning for the definition 
to be used consistently for the training of the police and 
judiciary (Sehl 2019).
The European Parliament has called on EU member 
states to adopt the definition (European Parliament 
2017) and has presented translations in 24 languages. 
The “Working Definition” has been formally adopted (in 
some cases already in the EUMC version) by ten states: 
Bulgaria, Germany, United Kingdom, Israel, Lithuania, 
Northern Macedonia, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, and 
the United States (e.g. EP Working Group on Antisem-
itism n. d.). The “Working Definition” is also being used 
to govern administrative action at the subnational level, 
e.g. in the federal states of Berlin, Bavaria and North 
Rhine-Westphalia as well as in several cities, including 
Munich,8 Leipzig, and Dortmund.
International governmental organizations working with 
the definition include, besides the IHRA, the OSCE, 
and in particular its Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights. Although the definition was never 
formally adopted, relevant papers of the organization 
refer to it.
Moreover, various non-governmental organizations 
work with the “Working Definition” or support its 
dissemination. At the international level, this includes 
the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the 
European Forum on Antisemitism, in Germany—the 
Amadeu Antonio Foundation, the Jewish Student 
Union Germany (Jüdische Studierendenunion 
Deutschland, JSUD), and the Department for Research 
and Information on Antisemitism (Recherche- und 
Informationsstelle Antisemitismus, RIAS),9 a Berlin-
based civil society-monitoring organization that is 
being replicated nationwide. Several civil society 
organizations and prominent figures from Germany 
make authoritative reference to the “Working 
Definition” more than once (JFDA 2019). Similar 
developments in the use of the “Working Definition” 
by various actors can be observed in many countries. 
Due to extensive media coverage, the best-known 
example is the longstanding dispute over antisemitism 
in the British Labour Party, which led to the “Working 
Definition” being adopted (at first with partly modified 
examples) into the party’s code of conduct (Labour 
Party 2018).
The definition was created not for scientific purposes. 
The “Working Definition” is therefore only occasionally 
used as a conceptual basis for scientific research on 
antisemitism (e.g. Salzborn and Voigt 2011; Imhoff 
2012; Becker 2018) and, if so, often with qualifying 
restrictions or critical extensions (e.g. Unabhängiger 
Expertenkreis Antisemitismus 2011: 10, 2017: 23; see 
also Pfahl-Traughber 2017). Thus, the criteria used in 
the “Working Definition” by no means represent the 
“minimal consensus within antisemitism research” 
(Salzborn and Voigt 2011: 293; identical wording in 
Salzborn 2018: 146), especially regarding the examples 
related to Israel.
D EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS
The “Working Definition” is a stipulative or regulating 
definition (Pawłowski 1980: 18). It does not define 
a new term (that would be a prescriptive definition) 
or record the current usage of an existing term in 
the language (that would be a descriptive definition). 
The stipulative definition is a sort of middle ground: 
A definition of an expression (E) in a language (L) is 
stipulative if “with this definition we partly keep to 
the meaning that this expression already had in the 
language L and partly depart from this meaning, e.g. 
in order to more sharply determine the conceptual 
scope of the expression E” (ibid.: 19). A key aspect of 
the controversy over the “Working Definition” is the 
question to what extent it fulfils this determination.
1  On the Character as a Working Definition 
The term, “working definition”, has two common 
meanings that are relevant in this context. 
(a) A working definition forms a practical basis for the 
work of its users. The modifier, “working”, merely 
signifies a function and does not affect the definition’s 
epistemological status. However, the second meaning 
is more common.
(b) A working definition has a preliminary character 
and is to be rephrased as a full-fledged definition after 
extensive research and concept development. In view 
of the incompleteness of the process, the criteria of a 
good definition are by definition not (entirely) fulfilled. 
In this case, we are dealing with a partial definition with 
a high degree of vagueness (ibid. 25, 125). However, 
in view of this unfinished character such a definition 
cannot easily be applied in practice (all the more so 
by laypersons) without reproducing precisely the 
problems that constitute its unfinished state.
The designation, “Working Definition of Antisemitism“, 
contains both meanings. As an instrument for fighting 
antisemitism, the definition did not aim for academic 
8 The case of Munich is particularly controversial. A city council resolution defines 
the pro-Palestinian movement, “Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions” (BDS), as 
antisemitic and prohibits the use of city premises for events that support BDS 
or even just deal with its topics (Munich 2017). The past years have seen the 
cancellation of many events organized by social actors accused under great public 
pressure of hostility toward Israel, proximity to BDS and antisemitism. 9 RIAS, 
however, despite strongly emphasizing the use of the IHRA definition, in fact works 
with a greatly modified definition. 
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or scientific clarification but was primarily meant to 
be a “practical tool” (Porat 2018: 45), in particular for 
monitoring antisemitic incidents (Stern 2017: 5).10 
At the same time, the choice of the term “working 
definition” reflects strong differences of opinion 
about the formulation and especially the emphasis 
on phenomena related to Israel in the definition and 
its examples. In particular, Russia and Scandinavian 
countries saw this as improperly confounding criticism 
of Israeli policies with antisemitism. In this regard, the 
designation, “working definition”, served to implement 
the instrument while, at the same time, maintaining its 
formally non-binding character (see also Unabhängiger 
Expertenkreis Antisemitismus 2017: 23) and openness 
to further development (Lerman 2018: Chap. 5).
However, the last ten years have shown that no further 
development of the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” 
has in fact occurred. Instead, due to the adoption by the 
IHRA, the definition is increasingly forming the basis of 
the work of various institutions. This institutional use all 
but requires the definition to be treated as complete in 
the sense of (a). For instance, collecting statistical data 
on antisemitic incidents or using the definition for (not) 
permitting events to take place requires a simple appli-
cation to cases (Does a case correspond to the definition 
or not?). The widespread perception of a provisional 
character, which is indeed suggested by the designation 
as a working definition, is thus misleading, and the 
analysis must examine whether the definition’s wording 
allows it to be applied in the sense of (a).11 
10 The EUMC version (n.d. [2005]) was preceded by the note: “The purpose of this 
document is to provide a practical guide for identifying incidents, collecting data, 
and supporting the implementation and enforcement of legislation dealing with 
antisemitism.” 11 By contrast, actually using the definition as a working definiti-
on in the sense of (b) would suggest a different way of dealing with it. In particular, 
it would involve further intensive work on the concept in the interplay of an analy-
sis of empirical phenomena and their conceptual delimitation.
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III ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION
A PERSPECTIVE OF THE EXPERT OPINION
On the one hand, the “Working Definition of Antisem-
itism” is a definition and must therefore fulfil the criteria 
for good definitions developed in epistemology and 
logic. On the other hand, as a working definition it 
should be practically useful in heterogeneous fields, 
including for users without academic specialization. 
This twofold claim is strong and leads to a twofold 
difficulty.
The first results from the fact that, even in the scientific 
discipline and all the more so in the general discourse, 
there is little agreement on what exactly antisemitism 
is (see also Engel 2009), what exactly the term refers 
to and what it does not refer to, how the associated 
phenomena can be explained, and on which levels of 
the social sphere they can be analyzed or observed. 
This applies all the more to the part that is intertwined 
with issues of the Middle East, the attitude toward 
Israel, and further associated topics that strongly 
polarize debates in society (Bergmann and Erb 1986 
and 1991; Rabinovici et al. 2004; Kohlstruck and 
Ullrich 2015; Ullrich and Kohlstruck 2017; Heilbronn 
et al. 2019). A universal stipulative definition (see 
above) would thus necessarily have to abstract from 
concrete individual scientific concepts of antisem-
itism, whose theoretical approaches are often not 
compatible, and determine a widely accepted core of 
antisesmitism. Such a definition would necessarily be 
highly conceptual and abstract. It would run the risk 
of becoming devoid of content and largely lose any 
concrete real-life reference, which raises the second 
difficulty resulting from the distinct logics of scientific 
research vs. application-oriented sectors of society. 
These differ regarding the degree of terminological 
specialization, epistemological requirements, the 
need for reflection on and variation of terms, the kind 
of available contextual knowledge and their orien-
tation toward results or implementation. Attempts to 
resolve this tension incur costs either at the expense of 
precision, complexity and abstraction or at the expense 
of general intelligibility and practicability.
This must be taken into account by the critical analysis, 
as must the fact that no definition can be devoid of 
ambiguity. How it is understood always depends inter 
alia on the prior understanding of its recipients. Thus, 
criteria such as „unambiguousness“ are only ideals 
that one tries to approximate as far as possible without 
ever being able to reach them. The analysis is therefore 
carried out with the knowledge that these aspirations 
cannot be fully realized. And criticism does not imply 
that a solution for what is criticized is always apparent. 
However, this does not render critical examination 
obsolete. The different aspirations of the „Working 
Definition of Antisemitism“ result in different levels of 
analysis, for which different perspectives specific to 
the respective fields apply (formal quality: logic/episte-
mology; plausibility and universal validity: research on 
antisemitism; practicability: multiple practical perspec-
tives). Yet these levels remain closely intertwined. 
Decisions regarding one of them carry implications 
for the others. This is reflected in the present expert 
opinion whose focus is on the formal aspects of the 
definition as well as the implications of its content.
The crucial criterion for the formal quality of a definition 
(see also Pawłowski 1980: 31, 75, 82) is that the term to 
be defined is described such that it is clearly possible to 
determine whether an object falls within the range of 
the term or not. This requires the definition to be worded 
unambiguously, not to contain any logical contradic-
tions or tautologies, to be adequate to the subject 
matter (that is, not to be based on irrelevant stipula-
tions), and to ensure that the term is clearly delimitated 
from other terms in content and range (including from 
other terms of the same class of phenomena12 and from 
any broader terms, in this case, for instance, racism or 
ethnocentrism). The more these conditions are deviated 
from, the higher the degree of vagueness and the less 
suitable the definition. With respect to the content, it 
remains to be discussed which phenomena classified as 
antisemitic by previous research are not covered by the 
definition and which phenomena whose classification 
as antisemitic may be problematic are covered by the 
definition. As far as it can be concluded from the existing 
information, the practicability of the definition will also 
be discussed. A more comprehensive assessment of 
this issue would, however, require an empirical survey 
of the application of the definition in the daily work of 
various institutional contexts.
B THE CORE DEFINITION
1  Vagueness
As has often been noted, the “Working Definition” 
is characterized by immense vagueness. It begins 
with the formulation that antisemitism is a “certain 
perception of Jews”. This ambiguous formulation 
leaves it to the addressees to construe the character 
of this perception. The explanation that follows in the 
second part of the sentence merely offers an indirect 
clarification by mentioning one way in which antisem-
itism “may” but need not be expressed (“hatred toward 
Jews”). Antisemitism is thereby implicitly concep-
tualized as an entity or structure that can manifest in 
various ways (essence/form). The second sentence 
mentions further possible manifestations, “rhetorical 
and physical” (implying that they are phenomena 
12 Not least due to the conceptual difficulties in defining antisemitism and the pro-
blematic origin of the word as a self-designation, there have been various proposals 
for replacing it, for instance by the term “allosemitism” (Bauman 1995).
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derived from the wider concept of antisemitism) but 
now in prescriptive, indicative form. The same type 
of language is used to specify the target of antisem-
itism: Jews and non-Jews, their property, and Jewish 
(religious) institutions.
Determining the range of those (potentially) affected by 
antisemitism is an important element of the definition. 
The reference to Jewish and non-Jewish persons is 
striking but justified, as for instance attacks or insults 
with an antisemitic motivation may be directed toward 
persons who are erroneously construed as (typically) 
Jewish by the attackers. Research on anti-Semitism 
often takes this aspect into account using the formu-
lation that antisemitism is directed toward persons 
as Jews, toward facilities as Jewish ones etc. The 
formulation used in the “Working Definition” (“toward 
Jewish or non-Jewish individuals”) can be misleading, 
as it unfortunately obscures a core semantic content of 
the concept of antisemitism (namely, that it is primarily 
directed toward what is or is construed as “Jewish”), 
which is largely uncontroversial.13 But here precision 
is important. Otherwise, any rhetorical or physical 
act or offence directed toward Jews (and possibly 
non-Jews!) could be classified as antisemitism even 
if it is an expression of a completely different constel-
lation of problems (see also Klug 2012). From disputes 
among neighbours to common acts of crime to armed 
conflicts or other kinds of vilification (homophobia, 
racism), there are many ways in which Jews can 
become the objects of adverse actions, which need 
not lend themselves to a reasonable interpretation as 
antisemitism.
Overall, three key aspects remain extremely vague: 
what antisemitism is understood to be at its core; 
which phenomena are to be regarded as antisemitic; 
and precisely toward whom they are directed. The 
vagueness results from ambiguous or contradictory 
determinations of the object, and contradictory 
alternation in the definition’s text between mandatory 
and non-mandatory stipulations as well as between 
statements about the essence and forms of appearance 
of the concept to be defined.
2  Gaps
The “Working Definition” creates an implicit (additive) 
concept of antisemitic phenomena by mentioning 
various concrete manifestations. This includes the 
characterization as a phenomenon of perception, 
emotion (hate), speech act and action, with all of these 
elements not being equally mandatory. This seemingly 
arbitrary selection of phenomena mentioned, on the 
one hand, contributes to the impression of vagueness 
and, on the other hand, produces systematic gaps.
The designation of antisemitism as a perception in the 
first sentence is already not entirely unproblematic. 
The term perception refers14 not least to sensory 
processes, such as seeing, hearing, smelling, and 
therefore its meaning extends at least to some degree 
into the empirical-sensory domain (despite also 
being somewhat applicable to collective processes 
of construction). In this wording, antisemitism can 
be understood as a more or less passive process of a 
sensory experience of Jews. By contrast, research 
predominantly holds that the antisemitic caricature 
of Jews is a product (e.g. of projections) and thus a 
generated result of antisemitism or antisemites (Holz 
2001: 62), and not a sensory perception. However, the 
text leaves room for interpretation in this regard as it 
also provides other designations of antisemitism.
On the other hand, other aspects, undoubtedly 
antisemitic, despite all differences of opinion within 
the discipline, are simply not covered by the definition. 
This applies, as alluded to above, to the discursive 
level of antisemitism that structures meaning and 
which research conceptualizes as a worldview or 
ideology, cultural semantics, a cultural code, inter-
pretational patterns, a collective stock of images, the 
structure of prejudices or (with an additional emotional 
component) resentment. Attitudes are likewise not 
an object of the definition even though population 
surveys on the subject of antisemitic attitudes strongly 
influence the media discourse on antisemitism. The 
dimension of mobilization in movements and parties 
(the organizational sociology perspective) is also 
omitted. The same is true of its institutional (e.g. legal) 
repercussions, for instance in discriminatory laws. 
Manifestations of antisemitism directed toward Jewish 
practices or practices with a Jewish connotation 
(circumcision, ritual slaughter) are also not covered. 
One might expect a definition based on phenomena 
or modes of expression rather than essence to rest 
on a more comprehensive or systematic selection of 
criteria. Some of the modes of expression used in the 
definition also unnecessarily limit the perspective. 
For instance, “hatred” is an emotional component of 
antisemitism, which the research often emphasizes as 
highly relevant. At the same time, there are antisemitic 
currents, especially in the antisemitism of bourgeois 
intellectuals of the 19th century directed against Jewish 
emancipation that explicitly claim a non-emotional, 
13 It is to be assumed that the diffuse formulation was chosen with the intention 
described and was merely ineptly drafted. Another interpretation is that this formu-
lation was intended to explicitly allow for including various more distant phenome-
na, such as so-called structural antisemitism. This term, which has hitherto been 
rather marginal in research but is more widespread in the political discourse (espe-
cially in Germany), does not primarily mean that antisemitism is a socio-structural 
category (this is a widespread and plausible view), but that the concept of antisemi-
tism can be extended to phenomena which are formally similar in their structure to 
hostility toward Jews while not themselves comprising a negative attitude to Jews 
(anti-Americanism or “oversimplified criticism of capitalism” are often mentioned 
in this regard). The definition of antisemitic acts/crimes/discrimination at the end of 
the text does not, by the way, suffer from such ambiguity but is a textbook example 
of clarity. 14 This is also related to a translation difficulty that further aggravates the 
problem in the German version of the definition, which the expert opinion was ori-
ginally based on. The English term perception can also mean apprehension and is 
thus slightly less restricted to sensory experience by (perceiving) persons than the 
German term, “Wahrnehmung“. A German term, such as Deutung (i.e. interpreta-
tion / framing), would be more appropriate overall and more open.
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“rational” self-image (Bergmann 2013). Thus, the 
definition emphasizes some antisemitic phenomena by 
explicitly mentioning them while largely omitting other 
key dimensions.
A definition of antisemitism certainly need not 
exhaust all possible phenomena that can more or less 
consensually be classified as antisemitic, nor does 
it have to name all dimensions that arise due to the 
respective foci of various specialized or theoretical 
frameworks. However, naming only a few, as the 
“Working Definition” does, accords special attention 
to these elements or the theoretical assumptions 
about the object implicit in them without clarifying 
in each particular case the exact status accorded to 
these privileged levels. The alternative to: (a) a theoret-
ically narrow or even reductionist determination or 
(b) a very comprehensive and (would-be) complete 
enumeration of all conceivable phenomena would 
have to rest on maximally open formulations, which 
would for instance focus on negative relationships to 
Jews, Judaism, and all things Jewish as such instead 
of concrete expressions thereof (hate, violence, etc.).15
C ON THE ROLE OF THE EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATORY NOTES
The vagueness of the core definition increases the 
significance of the explanatory notes and examples 
to elucidate the content of the definition (Klug 2018: 
para. 10). These parts of the text introduce distinc-
tions (e.g. between antisemitic and non-antisemitic 
criticism of Israel) that are important, not least for the 
political debate. However, due to their linguistic style, 
in particular several formulations with modal verbs 
indicating a possibility, they suffer from the same 
problems as the core definition.
An assessment of the eleven examples yields different 
results. There are some, which do indeed succeed 
in fulfilling the claim to illustrate the abstract term 
antisemitism using typical, recurring phenomena. 
These include: Example 1 (calling for the killing or 
harming of Jews); Example 2, which enumerates 
typical content found in antisemitic worldviews; 
Example 3, which illustrates that in antisemitism 
Jews as such are made collectively responsible for 
acts or behaviours of other Jews; Examples 4 and 5 
(Holocaust denial and the accusation of inventing or 
exaggerating the Holocaust); or Example 11 (holding 
Jews responsible for actions of the state of Israel). 
These and further examples clearly and tangibly 
indicate phenomena, which must undoubtedly be 
classified as antisemitic, largely independent of the 
concrete concept of antisemitism the analyst adheres 
to. However, some of them cannot readily be derived 
from the core definition.
The examples thus, in turn, aggravate the basic 
problem of vagueness. This occurs on three levels: (1) 
They introduce further levels of analysis or components 
of antisemitism not contained in the core definition; (2) 
some examples are ambiguous or only partly suitable, 
for instance because they pose problems of demar-
cation; and (3) the examples are often not interpreted 
in the manner envisaged by the explanatory notes 
(“taking into account the overall context”). 
1  Additional Components
Conspiracy theories, as one manifestation of antisem-
itism, and further aspects semantically characterizing 
antisemitism (including various stereotypes) are 
now mentioned as additional elements (which are 
not contained in the core definition). Some areas in 
which antisemitism may arise (public life, media, 
schools, workplace, religious sphere) are emphasized. 
Moreover, the definition treats one thematic subset 
very extensively by giving special attention to various 
aspects of hostility toward Israel together with notes 
on when such hostility is not to be considered antise-
mitic. The explanatory notes and seven of the eleven 
examples refer to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Other quite essential formative contexts and traditions 
of antisemitism, particularly right-wing extremism 
and Christianity, are mentioned only in passing or 
not at all.16 This results in a tension between the core 
definition and the examples.
Thus, the aspects referenced in the explanatory 
notes and examples are not merely illustrations of 
the conceptual scope delimited (albeit vaguely) by 
the definition, but rather expand it. Accordingly, it is 
crucial and fraught with consequences in applying the 
definition whether one considers only the core definition 
or regards the explanatory notes and examples as 
part of it. And, as has been set forth, this is handled in 
different ways.
2  Problems of Demarcation
The tangible examples mentioned above, which 
are generally not called into question by the existing 
criticism are as such clear instances of antisemitism 
(Klug 2018). Other phenomena mentioned in the 
examples can only be classified as antisemitic using 
further information, as what is described is ambiguous 
15 Michael Kohlstruck and I (2015: 18), for instance, tried to outline the direction 
that such a container concept of antisemitism might take for practical purposes of 
data collection without requiring a prior theoretical-political commitment: “‘Antise-
mitism’ as an umbrella and container term refers to all individual and collective phe-
nomena in which a negative relationship toward Judaism is documented. Antise-
mitic phenomena are characterized by the assumption of an inner homogeneity of 
Judaism and the ascription of certain negatively valued properties or behaviours to 
Jews as such. A negative relationship to this category is espoused toward individu-
als, groups, property or institutions as far as they are associated with Judaism from 
an antisemitic perspective and are thus regarded as representatives.” This definition, 
too, is afflicted by problems and uncertainties, for instance with regards to the role 
of stereotypically ascribing properties with a positive connotation and understan-
ding “Judaism” as a primarily religious category, which would be far too narrow for 
an adequate concept of antisemitism. 16 Right-wing extremism is not mentioned 
separately but is at least alluded to in the example of Holocaust denial/relativization, 
which, however, is not limited to the political Right. Christian anti-Judaism is at least 
addressed in one example with reference to medieval Christian legends under the 
designation of “classic antisemitism”. The Protestant tradition going back to Martin 
Luther with its formative influence on modern antisemitism is not mentioned at all. 
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and occurs in complex, overlapping constellations 
of conflicts, which often do not allow it to be readily 
assigned to one specific issue such as antisemitism. 
Classifying these phenomena as antisemitic requires 
further information about the context, for instance 
about the motives or ideological dispositions of the 
perpetrators (Kohlstruck and Ullrich 2015: 84)17 or 
about the context-related significance of symbols and 
knowledge about them (e.g. swastika as a Nazi symbol 
or religious symbol), and their possibly different modes 
of reception (Ullrich 2013: 52, 85).
All difficult examples from the definition are ones 
that refer to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In all 
cases, the problem arises in particular because besides 
various non-antisemitic criticisms and hostile percep-
tions that arise in the context of the actual Arab-Israeli 
conflict over territory, life opportunities etc., there 
always can be and there also are interpretations of the 
conflict that are in fact antisemitic. In this context, it 
is crucial how the examples are construed and which 
aspects are emphasized, e.g. which formulations are 
perceived as particularly relevant verbal signals.
The following explanatory note illustrates this:
 
Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of 
Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. 
At first glance, this is a correct formulation with respect 
to a subset of antisemitic phenomena. Antisemitism 
can use Israel as camouflage or be directed against 
the state of Israel as the “collective Jew”. However, the 
sentence can also be understood to mean that criticism 
of Israel is antisemitic when Israel is understood as a 
Jewish collective. But the definition of Israel as Jewish 
is part of social reality and occurs in the self-definition 
of the state as the Jewish nation state, its symbols, 
its citizenship law, the claim of institutional politics in 
Israel to represent all Jews, and the pro-Israel positions 
of many Jewish organizations. Criticism of this Jewish 
definition of collectivity and the mechanisms of 
exclusion implied by it is not antisemitic as such (see 
also Brumlik 2007).
Similar interpretational difficulties also arise with 
respect to another example from the “Working 
Definition”: 
Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determina tion, 
e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a 
racist endeavor. 
Research has shown that there is a form of anti-Zi-
onism that does not criticize Zionism and Israel as 
Jewish nationalism, but rejects it as Jewish nation-
alism, demonizes it as a fundamental evil of the world, 
and fits it into a conspiratorial worldview. Interpreta-
tional patterns that occur in this context, such as an 
interpretation of Zionism as a mere manifestation of 
racism or the Manichaean contrast between Zionism 
as a powerful, “artificial”, and thus illegitimate nation-
alism vs. “the peoples” construed as “natural” and 
thus legitimate but oppressed by, among others, “the 
Zionists”, “the USA” etc. match the semantic structure 
of antisemitism. Such interpretations are found in 
particular in Stalinist anti-Zionism (Holz 2001: Chap. 
XII) and its repercussions in the New Left, and parts 
of the Palestine solidarity movement (for the German-
speaking countries Kloke 1994; Reiter 2001; Späti 
2005; Ullrich 2008). 
A different assessment is required for universalist 
(secular and antinational) criticisms of a national 
movement rooted in Jewish identity (a criticism 
which has long existed, for instance, in the labour 
movement, not least among non-Zionist Jews) or a 
Jewish, religiously motivated distant attitude toward 
Zionism and criticism of aspects of Zionism that can 
be considered racist. This includes, for example, the 
exclusively Jewish settlement policy, the policy of 
“Hebrew labour” in Mandatory Palestine that excluded 
others (mainly Arabs), or current practices of exclusion 
toward Palestinian citizens of Israel, Palestinians in 
the occupied territories or non-Jewish migrants, in 
particular African refugees.
Without further contextualization, the formulation 
quoted above would by definition exclude certain 
attitudes toward Israel from the spectrum of what 
can be said and would define post- or antinational 
viewpoints as antisemitic. Such accusations are often 
levelled against proponents of a bi-national vision for 
solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which implies an 
end to a state that views itself as Jewish). This creates 
a double standard with respect to Israel in a different 
sense than is otherwise discussed.18 However, the 
discussion for instance about the connection between 
racism and nation-states is a global one which can of 
course also be conducted with respect to Israel.
A comparable ambivalence emerges in another 
example: 
Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to 
the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the inte-
rests of their own nations. 
17 The same issue arose, for instance, with respect to the controversial classifica-
tions of homicides (presumably) motivated by right-wing ideology. Occasionally, it 
is not easy to reconstruct whether a homicide is attributable to extreme right-wing 
views, organizational contexts and the like or, for example, to phenomena of group 
dynamics, youth violence, toxic masculinity or classical motives for murder such 
as greed, jealousy, etc. (Feldmann et al. 2016; Feldmann et al. 2018). 18 This is in 
any case an interesting aspect of the discussion about antisemitism in the con-
text of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas recognizing Israel’s right to exist is often 
a prerequisite for being ascribed a legitimate (non-antisemitic) speaking position, 
the same does not apply to recognizing a “Palestinian right to self-determination”.
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The example refers to the classical antisemitic topos 
of Jewish separation and disloyalty, and is thus quite 
rightly included. However, if this example is to be used 
as a criterion, it places high demands on the sophis-
tication of those assessed in view of the often strong 
loyalties of some Jews and Jewish organizations 
toward Israel. As a generalizing accusation against 
“the Jews”, it would be a clear case of antisemitism. 
As an accusation against certain persons or organi-
zations (the formulation allows for both), it would be 
more difficult to classify—it could be interpreted as 
antisemitic or as a more or less correct factual claim, a 
polemical exaggeration or the like.
In the case of other examples, the formulation is vague 
because it offers no workable distinguishing criteria:
However, criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against 
any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. (Ex. 8 
argues the other way around: “Applying double standards 
by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of 
any other democratic nation.”)
On the one hand, this sentence is an important 
clarification and indicates that there exists (possibly 
very harsh) criticism of Israel that is not antisemitic, 
as Israel—like any object of consideration—may per 
se be subject to justified criticism. On the other hand, 
the distinguishing criterion being offered is unclear 
and lacks an applicable standard. It is often observed 
that Israel is criticized particularly frequently and 
vehemently. But to what extent can criticism and the 
frequency of its utterance be considered “similar” 
in view of the very different characteristics of the 
objects of criticism? For instance, other democratic 
countries that are not occupying powers will not be 
criticized for a decades-old occupation policy. To the 
extent that the increased attention on Israel has its 
roots in the genocide of the European Jews and the 
subsequent attempts at national exoneration by 
reversing the roles of perpetrators and victims,19 it is 
to be classified as antisemitic. However, without doubt 
the increased attention on Israel in the media and in 
politics also has other reasons. Israel’s particular 
history (and present existence) and the geopolitical 
significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict also increase 
the likelihood of it being a subject of discussion and 
thus also the likelihood of an unequal distribution of 
criticism in comparison to other countries. The explan-
atory sentence is to be welcomed in its implicit moral 
demand to apply universal standards, as is Example 8, 
which reverses the argument. However, this demand 
is in fact not fulfilled universally (that is, also for 
conflicts without connection to antisemitism or Israel), 
as most political actors have restricted thematic, 
regional, and other areas of interest. Onesidedness, 
endorsing a certain perspective, double standards, 
and the like are not a sufficient criterion for identifying 
antisemitism.20 
In some circumstances, this applies even to inappro-
priate or tasteless comparisons that are mentioned in 
one example: 
Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that 
of the Nazis. 
Comparing Israel, individual Israelis or Jews with 
National Socialism is part of the standard repertoire of 
the antisemitic reversal of the roles of perpetrators and 
victims, in particular in antisemitism motivated by a 
deflection of guilt (also known as “guilt-defensiveness 
antisemitism”). At the same time, comparisons 
with National Socialism are a near-universal means 
of expressing political outrage, vilifying political 
opponents or, especially at present, when radical 
right-wing movements, parties and state projects are 
experiencing a revival, making more or less accurate 
analytical comparisons. Such comparisons are also 
present in intra-Jewish discussions (e.g. Stern 2017: 
10), and radical right-wing actors in Israeli politics do 
exist. Assessing the content of such a comparison 
depends inter alia on the context in which it is uttered 
and on the potential for discursive resonance of that 
context. At least in Germany, such comparisons to 
National Socialism are not acceptable and often 
motivated by antisemitism, as they imply a relativ-
ization of guilt based on nationalist convictions. It is 
also obvious that this analysis does not apply to Israel 
or, for instance, the United States, where comparisons 
with National Socialism are usually drawn from the 
self-heroizing perspective of the liberators from 
National Socialism (Ullrich and Arnold 2015).
Thus, none of the examples problematized here are 
wrong. However, in view of their ambiguity, classifying 
the described types of occurrences as antisemitic 
requires additional information or, as the explanatory 
note in the “Working Definition” rightly but too tersely 
puts it: “taking into account the overall context”.
3  On the Use of the Examples
In this sense, it is not so much the examples that are 
problematic, but above all their inappropriate and 
negligent use. Such use is further reinforced and 
popularized by other popular but even less analytically 
suitable rules of thumb such as the 3D test (demon-
ization, double standards, delegitimization). If the 
examples are read bearing in mind the explanatory 
notes and taking into account the overall context, each 
individual assessment requires a precise analysis. In 
practice, the examples are often used as if they were 
unambiguous cases of antisemitism as such (Klug 
2018: para. 11). Such use is inappropriate, as it lacks 
19 This is a discursive strategy especially common and functional from a nationa-
list perspective in the successor countries of the perpetrators, especially Germany, 
but also in (extreme right-wing) political currents sympathizing with them in other 
countries. 20 This also illustrates that positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict can al-
so be problematic for entirely different reasons not connected to antisemitism. 
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contextualization or reduces complex circumstances 
to a single dimension, namely antisemitism.21 
Especially in the case of multidimensional conflict 
situations, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and its 
contested interpretations, this provides a gateway 
for using the “Working Definition” in a reductionist 
manner to morally discredit opposing positions 
with the accusation of antisemitism, which is highly 
sensitive, especially in Germany. Avoiding this would 
require consistently interpreting the examples within 
the context of the core definition, which, however, 
only allows for limited clarification in view of its 
weaknesses. Such clarification is sometimes method-
ologically complex, especially in cases of camouflaged 
antisemitism and so-called detour communication, but 
can be accomplished with the tools of reconstructive 
social research (e.g. Holz 2001).
D SUITABILITY 
In view of the broad acceptance of the “Working 
Definition” in various fields, the claim to create a 
broadly applicable definition of antisemitism seems 
to be empirically fulfilled. However, the analysis has 
also shown that the definition cannot be regarded as 
a comprehensive definition of antisemitism applicable 
in all possible fields of action in government and civil 
society. Its concrete language that dispenses with 
technical terms, the clear and tangible formulation 
of many examples, and thus the accessibility of 
the “Working Definition” as well as some of the 
distinctions drawn are certainly advantageous for 
various areas of practice. The “Working Definition” 
clearly fills a need in a field characterized by a high 
degree of conceptual insecurity and lack of orien-
tation (Engel 2009; Klug 2012; Kohlstruck and Ullrich 
2015). But plus and minus are two sides of the same 
coin: The very low level of precision and the internal 
contradictions as well as the glaring gaps are not an 
acceptable price for accessibility. Using the definition 
requires complex contextual knowledge and can lead 
to reductionist interpretations if the definition is applied 
schematically. It fails in its claim to solve the problems of 
general conceptual clarification and universal practical 
applicability, at the same time.22
21 If, for instance, a Palestinian from East Jerusalem criticizes her precarious legal 
status, her treatment by the Israeli border authorities upon entry into Israel and the 
like as manifestations of a racist state, one may agree with this assessment or not. 
But this assessment itself does not yet imply the minimal requirement for defini-
tions of antisemitism formulated above (negative relationship to a they-group con-
ceived of as Jewish). This would require a more complex discussion of this person’s 
worldview. 22 The cause for the definition’s success may lie in an aspect of every 
definition that cannot be elaborated upon here extensively for pragmatic reasons: 
its symbolic or signaling function. Its concrete form also serves to form an identi-
ty and to reduce complexity in political conflicts, and thus as a political and moral 
commitment that both calls for a positioning and suggests certainty for action. This 
function of the definition as a “statement against antisemitism” was also empha-
sized in the interview by the IHRA representative.
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IV SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS  
FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Systematic gaps, lack of clarity in formulations, 
contradictory and error-prone application in practice, 
and an unclear legal status of the “Working Definition 
of Antisemitism” cause confusion. This also has impli-
cations for fundamental rights. One particularly severe 
such implication is the possibility resulting from these 
uncertainties of the definition being instrumentalized in 
dealing with disfavoured positions on Middle East policy 
(Stern 2017), which are rashly classified as antisemitic 
due to an imprecise and inappropriate usage of the 
definition that is also prefigured in parts of the text. After 
all, the text devotes much less space to other contexts in 
which antisemitism occurs, such as religion or right-wing 
extremism. The text is thus not only an anti-antisemitic 
signal but also a signal for Middle East policy.
Particularly when abridgments of fundamental rights, 
such as freedom of speech or freedom of assembly 
are justified with reference to the “Working Definition” 
(the prevention of public events and denial of premises 
for pro-Palestinian groups, and the public designation 
of some groups as antisemitic by state institutions23 
are particularly relevant in this context), the legal 
requirements for any such abridgment, namely, the 
legal principles of clarity and determinacy of norms 
would need to be fulfilled. It has been set forth in detail 
that the text of the “Working Definition” does not 
satisfy these principles. The assessment of individual 
incidents or actions using the “Working Definition” is 
based more on the implicit preconceptions of those 
applying it or on hegemonic interpretations adopted 
without reflection than on clear criteria. Thus, decision 
processes that refer to the definition are subject merely 
to a fiction of intersubjective guidance that precludes 
arbitrariness. The use of the definition instead provides 
procedural legitimacy for decisions, which are in 
fact taken according to different criteria that remain 
implicit. The ongoing dissemination and institutional 
recognition of the definition objectifies its claim to 
validity and promises orientation for actors in the field 
although in fact this remains a mere promise.
The structural problems of the core definition are 
aggravated when the supplementary examples related 
to Israel are understood as examples of antisemitism 
as such, contrary to the explanatory notes in the text 
(“taking into account the overall context”). This is not 
a weakness of the definition but rather a consequence 
of its inappropriate use as a “list of symptoms” or 
“checklist”, which is facilitated by its vague formula-
tions. If pointed political statements with respect to 
Israel are merely subjected to a schematic assessment 
that should instead take into account the overall 
context, accusations of antisemitism may be levelled 
without good reason and may nevertheless legitimize 
drastic measures. This development, which has 
been virulent in recent years, can be interpreted as a 
juridification and securitization of the political debate 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The “Working Definition 
of Antisemitism” thereby provides a gateway for the 
stigmatization and public disadvantaging of disfa-
voured positions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 
view of its quasi-legal status, this must be regarded as 
a threat to freedom of speech.
23 Most recently in the German parliament’s resolution on the boycott move-
ment BDS (http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2019/kw20-de-
bds-642892), which classifies the movement as antisemitic with reference to 
the “Working Definition”. In this resolution, the parliament calls on the German 
government “not to support events of the BDS movement or of groups that ac-
tively pursue its goals” and “not to fund any projects that call for a boycott of Isra-
el or that actively support the BDS movement” (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/19/101/1910191.pdf, own translation). 
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V OUTLOOK: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH  
THE “WORKING DEFINITION”
Mainly due to its technical weaknesses, the deficient 
practice of its application, its nevertheless partly 
binding legal status, and its potential for political 
instrumentalization with problematic implications for 
freedom of speech, the use of the “Working Definition 
of Antisemitism” cannot be recommended.
With the formulation and adoption of the “Working 
Definition”, the urgency of an acute threat to Jewish 
life was recognized at least symbolically, and insti-
tutions of the state and civil society were promised 
instruments for monitoring and fighting antisemitism. 
At the same time, the discussion received a necessary 
update through the inclusion of hitherto less examined 
aspects of antisemitism related to Israel, as the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict is currently an important context for the 
occurrence of antisemitic phenomena. However, these 
positive aspects do not make up for the structural 
weaknesses of the text. Unfortunately, contrary to the 
expectation raised by the name “Working Definition”, 
hardly any further elaboration or clarification occurred. 
But without a profound revision or rethinking, which 
would have to resolve the inherent contradiction 
ingrained in the multiple task of formulating a definition 
that is, at once, formally correct and generally binding 
as well as applicable in practice across sectors, the 
“Working Definition of Antisemitism” is not suitable for 
application.
A meaningful use is possible only, if at all, in very limited 
areas, namely in low-threshold pedagogical settings 
particularly because of the accessibility of some of 
the examples included. In this context, the definition 
may be useful as a sensitizing concept (Ullrich and 
Werner 2011: 436) for recognizing potential antisemitic 
phenomena. However, this only applies if the overall 
context, including the explanatory notes, is taken as a 
basis, and the examples are situated in the discourse 
and treated with sensitivity for the context. This does 
not apply if antisemitism is to be treated comprehen-
sively or in depth.
A clearly formulated and thus more suitable definition 
of antisemitism for practical applications would be 
desirable.24 A more manageable but no less important 
task would be to focus on a definition of antisemitic 
incidents for collecting data on the extent of and 
changes in antisemitic threats. This was, after all, 
one of the key concerns in the development of the 
“Working Definition”. This need still exists, including 
with respect to various aspects relating to Israel, as 
the problem persists with data collection practices 
being highly inconsistent, sometimes even contra-
dictory (Kohlstruck and Ullrich 2015). The analysis of 
the “Working Definition” can be instructive for this 
purpose especially for giving up inappropriate claims 
as they can hardly all be satisfied at the same time. 
Thus, such projects should focus not on universal 
solutions but on developing context-specific instru-
ments, which necessarily requires making choices in 
particular about the main purpose of the definition and 
thereby the target groups and context of application.
24 By contrast, such a claim is simply unrealistic for the research landscape with 
its different paradigms.
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VI APPENDIX
A TEXT OF THE “WORKING DEFINITION” 
WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES AND 
EXAMPLES (IHRA)
In the spirit of the Stockholm Declaration that states: 
“With humanity still scarred by …antisemitism and 
xenophobia the international community shares 
a solemn responsibility to fight those evils” the 
committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial 
called the IHRA Plenary in Budapest 2015 to adopt the 
following working definition of antisemitism. 
On 26 May 2016, the Plenary in Bucharest decided to: 
Adopt�the�following�non-legally�binding�working�
definition�of�antisemitism:
“Antisemitism�is�a�certain�perception�of�Jews,�which�
may�be�expressed�as�hatred�toward�Jews�Rhetorical�
and�physical�manifestations�of�antisemitism�are�
directed�toward�Jewish�or�non-Jewish�individuals�
and/or�their�property,�toward�Jewish�community�
institutions�and�religious�facilities”
To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may 
serve as illustrations:
Manifestations might include the targeting of the state 
of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, 
criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any 
other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. 
Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring 
to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews 
for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, 
writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister 
stereotypes and negative character traits.
Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, 
the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious 
sphere could, taking into account the overall context, 
include, but are not limited to:
–  Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming 
of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an 
extremist view of religion.
–  Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, 
or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or 
the power of Jews as collective—such as, especially 
but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish 
conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, 
economy, government or other societal institutions.
–  Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for 
real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single 
Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed 
by non-Jews.
–  Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas 
chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the 
Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist 
Germany and its supporters and accomplices during 
World War II (the Holocaust).
–  Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of 
inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
–  Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to 
Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, 
than to the interests of their own nations.
–  Denying the Jewish people their right to self-deter-
mination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a 
State of Israel is a racist endeavour.
–  Applying double standards by requiring of it a 
behaviour not expected or demanded of any other 
democratic nation.
–  Using the symbols and images associated with 
classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing 
Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
–  Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy 
to that of the Nazis.
–  Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of 
the state of Israel.
Antisemitic�acts�are�criminal�when they are so defined 
by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distri-
bution of antisemitic materials in some countries).
Criminal�acts�are�antisemitic when the targets of 
attacks, whether they are people or property—such as 
buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries—
are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, 
Jewish or linked to Jews.
Antisemitic�discrimination is the denial to Jews of 
opportunities or services available to others and is 
illegal in many countries.
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B ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS
The expert opinion was prepared mainly on the basis 
of desktop research. An expert interview with a repre-
sentative of IHRA was also used. I am grateful to Jannik 
Landmark (Center for Research on Antisemitism, TU 
Berlin) for his support in researching and processing 
information. An earlier version of the expert opinion 
was discussed with some colleagues, whom I thank 
for their valuable suggestions. The responsibility for all 
assessments lies solely with the author. Special thanks 
are due to Felix Pahl for the excellent translation.
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